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LAST HIRED, FIRST FIRED LAYOFFS
AND TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1 prohibits discrimi-
nation by employers, employment agencies, and labor unions on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Although
the main focus of the Act is on the elimination of discrimination,
the congressional debates indicate significant concern with the
high rate of minority unemployment.' It was thought that Title
VII would tend to equalize unemployment rates for minority and
nonminority workers by ensuring nondiscriminatory selection of
new employees. However, in periods of economic downturn, non-
discrimination alone may not increase minority employment or
promote the integration of work forces.
Due to the current recession, many employers who had only
recently hired significant numbers of minority employees have
been forced to lay off workers.3 Often collective bargaining agree-
ments between the employer and the union contain a last hired,
first fired clause providing that employees with least seniority be
laid off first.' The application of such a clause frequently re-
sults in the layoff of a disproportionate number of minority work-
ers, that is, the percentage of minority workers in the group laid
off exceeds their percentage in the work force. In the past two
years numerous suits have been brought challenging such layoffs.
§§ 701-16, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe to 2oooe-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Act].
2 See 1io CONG. REC. 7204, 7222 (1964) (remarks of Senator Clark); id. at
7240 (remarks of Senator Case).
' See N.Y. Times, Nov. io, 1974, § 3, at 1, 5; Wall Street Journal, Nov. S,
X974, at i, col. 6.
The term minority as used in this Note includes racial and ethnic minorities
and women. Similarly the term racial imbalance will be used to refer to sexual,
racial, or ethnic imbalance.
4 See P-H IND. REL., UNION CONTS. ff 53520 (1970).
' See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-lo64); Bales v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., LAB. REL. REP. (9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 234 (N.D. Cal. Jan.
27, 1975) (preliminary injunction denied) ; Cates v. Trans World Airlines, 8 Empl.
Prac. Dec. f 9755 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. I, X974) (denying defendant's motion to dismiss
on statute of limitations grounds); Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW,
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 69o (D.N.J. Sept. 5, X974), supplemented, 8 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. 959 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1974), vacated and remanded, LAB. REL. REP. (9
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 117 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1975); Loy v. City of Cleveland, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 614 (N.D. Ohio March 29, 1974), dismissed as moot, 8 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 2974); Delay v. Carling Brewing Co.,
CCH EmPL. PRAC. GuiDE (9 Empl. Prac. Dec.) ff 9877 (N.D. Ga. June 25, 2974);
Cox v. Allied Chemical Corp., 382 F. Supp. 309 (M.D. La. 1974); Watkins v.
Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), supplemented, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 729 (E.D. La. May X4, 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604,
5th Cir., June 27, 1974.
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LAYOFFS AND TITLE VII
Courts have reached conflicting results on whether such layoffs
violate Title VII.6
This Note will examine whether last hired, first fired layoffs
violate Title VII. In section I it is argued that principles devel-
oped in cases dealing with other aspects of seniority systems are
applicable to layoffs, but that last hired, first fired layoffs dis-
criminate against only some minority employees. A means of
determining which employees are entitled to relief is proposed.
In sections II and III, theories which have been suggested to
justify more extensive relief are examined and rejected.
I. SENIORITY AND THE PERPETUATION
OF PAST DISCRIMINATION
A. The Theory of Liability
The first case to hold that last hired, first fired layoffs violate
Title VII was Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369.7 In Wat-
kins, over one-half the work force at the ,Continental Can Com-
pany's Harvey, Louisiana plant had been laid off under a collective
bargaining agreement which provided that both layoff and recall
be made on the basis of seniority. Because the company had not
hired substantial numbers of blacks before 1967, all but two
blacks were laid off.' The court properly directed its inquiry to
whether the layoff was discriminatory. The court noted that the
prior exclusion of blacks from the work force prevented them
from acquiring sufficient seniority to avoid layoff. Applying the
principle that present neutral practices which perpetuate the ef-
fects of past discrimination are prohibited, the court concluded
that the use of seniority to allocate layoffs violated Title VII.9
6 Compare Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1974),
petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-1o64), and
Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, LAB. RaL. REP. (9 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas.) 117 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, i975), with Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369
F. Supp. X221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17,
1974.
7 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5 th Cir., June
17, 1974.
81d. at 1223-24.
'Id. at 1225-26. The court also held, see id. at X230, that the layoff violated
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), which provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the
same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws
and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by
white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Supreme Court held
that 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (197o), which like § i981 is derived from the Civil Rights Act
19751 I545
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The court's reasoning can at most establish that the last hired,
first fired layoff discriminated against some black employees -
those who might have been hired earlier absent the employer's
past hiring discrimination. ° The court did not limit relief to
these blacks; rather the court granted a remedy which benefited
black employees regardless of whether they were discriminated
against by the layoff. The court ordered that a certain percentage
of the laid off black employees be recalled so that the racial bal-
ance of the plant would not be substantially altered by the lay-
off." In granting the broader remedy the court relied on cases
ordering preferential hiring of minority workers. 2 However, the
court failed to consider whether the justification for remedying
racial imbalance by accelerated hiring of minority workers is
applicable to preserving racial balance by limiting layoffs of mi-
nority workers. 3
The principle that facially neutral practices which perpetuate
past discrimination violate Title VII was first developed in de-
of 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27, prohibits racial discrimination in the sale or rental of
housing by private individuals. The Act as interpreted was held a valid exercise of
congressional power under the thirteenth amendment.
Following this lead, numerous lower courts have held that § 1981 bars racial
discrimination by private employers. See, e.g., Young v. International Telephone
& Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir. 197) ; Boudreaux v. Baton Rouge Marine
Contracting Co., 437 F.2d ioui (5th Cir. 197); Sanders v. Dobbs Houses, Inc.,
431 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (197); Waters v. Wis-
consin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 91X (1970).
Arguments that Title VII repealed § I98i by implication were rejected. These
cases have allowed plaintiffs to bring suit under § 1981 where some of the pro-
cedural prerequisites to a Title VII action were not met. However, the sub-
stantive law developed under Title VII has been applied in § x98I cases. See
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309, I316 (7th Cir. 1974), petition
for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-3o64); Watkins v.
Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974. Divergence in the law of § 3983
and Title VII would be particularly inappropriate where the case involves the
definition of discrimination and a determination of whether a practice is dis-
criminatory.
10 See pp. 1552-54 infra.
" See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 729,
730-31 (E.D. La. May 34, 1974), supplementing 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La.
1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-26o4, 5th Cir., June 37, 1974.
12See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2639, 369 F. Supp. 3221, 3233, citing
United States v. IBEW Local 212, 472 F.2d 634 (6th Cir. 3973) ; United States v.
Lathers Local 46, 473 F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 939 (1973) ;
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 329-31 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 950 (972) ; Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 3047 (5th
Cir. 1969); NAACP v. Allen, 340 F. Supp. 703 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d
634 (5th Cir. 1974).
13 See pp. 1563-70 infra.
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partmental seniority '" and union hiring hall cases. 15 The depart-
mental seniority cases involved plants which had hired blacks in
the past but which had maintained segregated work forces. Typi-
cally the plants were divided into separate departments or lines
of progression with blacks assigned to jobs in the lower paying,
less desirable departments or lines of progression. Furthermore,
minorities were prohibited from transferring into the white de-
partments. Seniority for purposes of promotion and layoff was
calculated from the time the employee began to work in his de-
partment. Even when segregation of the departments was ended,
black employees transferring into the formerly white departments
could not carry over seniority rights accumulated prior to their
transfer. Thus blacks who wished to transfer were required to
accept a greater risk of layoff and a smaller likelihood of promo-
tion than whites who had worked for the employer for a shorter
time.' 6
The first case challenging a departmental seniority system was
Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc.,'7 where the court found the dis-
parity between the opportunity of blacks and whites to obtain
positions in the more desirable, formerly white departments to be
discriminatory. 8 Since .white employees were assigned to these
departments at the time they were first hired, their departmental
seniority was approximately the same as their plant seniority, that
is, their total length of service at the plant. Because black em-
ployees had been assigned only to the less desirable departments,
their departmental seniority in the more desirable departments
was dated only from the time of their transfer; thus they would
have far less departmental than plant seniority. Since promotion
was governed by departmental seniority, 9 blacks would not be
4 See, e.g., United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 451 F.2d 418 (5th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 406 US. 906 (1972) ; United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp.,
446 F.2d 652 (2d Cir. 197i); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 79L (4th
Cir. 1971), petition for cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. ioo6 (1971); Local i89, Paper-
makers v. United States, 416 F.2d 98o (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919
(1970); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 5o5 (E.D. Va. 1968).
1" See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th
Cir. 1969); Heat & Frost Insulators Local 53 v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 315 F. Supp. 1202 (W.D. Wash.
197o), aff'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9 th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); EEOC v.
Plumbers Local i89, 311 F. Supp. 468 (S.D. Ohio 1970), vacated on other grounds,
438 F.2d 408 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 832 (971); Dobbins v. IBEW
Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413 (S.D. Ohio 1968).
"6 For a more complete discussion of the operation of departmental seniority
systems see Blumrosen, Seniority and Equal Employment Opportunity: A Glimmer
of Hope, 23 RuTGERs L. REV. 268, 275-80 (1969).
x 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
'





able to compete successfully with whites within the formerly white
departments. This difference was a result of the discrimination
which occurred before the effective date of Title VII rather than
a result of differences in qualifications. Because the use of de-
partmental seniority would perpetuate the past practice of pre-
ferring whites over blacks in the more desirable departments, this
use of seniority was held a violation of Title VII.20 The court
ordered that blacks hired into the formerly black departments
before the employer ceased discriminatory hiring be allowed to
compete for future vacancies in the more desirable departments
on the basis of their plant seniority.2
A similar theory has been applied in cases dealing with re-
ferral rules in craft unions which previously excluded minority
tradesmen. 2 Collective bargaining agreements in the construc-
tion trades often establish referral systems in which the unions
operate hiring halls to assign tradesmen to the available jobs.
The unions often classify tradesmen into priority groups for re-
ferral with first priority given to tradesmen with a certain amount
of experience on jobs covered by the collective bargaining agree-
ment." Even where blacks were eventually allowed to use the
hiring halls, their prior exclusion prevented them from acquiring
experience under the collective bargaining agreement. Thus they
would be placed in the lower priority groups even if they had an
equivalent amount of experience on nonunion jobs.24 Courts have
uniformly held that such referral rules violate Title VII since
present decisions among workers are determined by discrimina-
tion in the past.2" The unions were ordered to modify their re-
ferral rules so that any tradesman with the requisite amount of
experience would be placed in the first priority group regardless
of whether his experience was gained on union or nonunion jobs."
The legislative history of Title VII is a major obstacle to
reforming seniority systems under the theory that present em-
ployment decisions based on criteria which reflect past discrimi-
nation are prohibited. Several members of Congress expressed
concern that the Act would destroy seniority systems by requiring
employers to attain racial balance in their work forces." Sup-
20 1d. at 5,7-19.
21 Id. at 519-21.
22 See cases cited note I5 supra.
21 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d X23, X30-
31 (8th Cir. 1969).
24 See, e.g., id. at 131.
25 See cases cited note 15 supra.
26 See, e.g., United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 32, 416 F.2d 123, 133
(8th Cir. 1969).
27 See H.R. REP. No. 914, 88th Cong., ist Sess. 71-72 (1963); 120 CONc. REc.
486-87 (I964) (remarks of Senator Hill).
1548 [Vol. 88:1x544
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porters of the Act denied that it would have this effect. Senator
Clark, who with Senator Case was floor manager of Title VII in
the Senate, submitted a memorandum prepared by the Depart-
ment of Justice which stated that Title VII would not affect
existing seniority rights.2" The memorandum indicated that no
differences in the treatment of employees based on seniority -
and in particular, last hired, first fired layoffs -could be taken
to violate the Act.2  In addition, Senators Clark and Case pre-
pared a memorandum which noted that the Act was prospective,
not retrospective, and that employers were required only to act in
the future on a nondiscriminatory basis, but not required to alter
existing seniority rights.30
The force of this history is not clear, however, because there
are some indications that where Congress realized that nondis-
crimination in the future could not be accomplished without
frustrating the expectations of white employees, the goal of non-
discrimination was to prevail. The memorandum prepared by
Senators Clark and Case states that seniority systems would be
28 iio CoNG. REC. 7207 (1964). The relevant portion of this memorandum is
as follows:
Title VII would have no effect on seniority rights existing at the time it
takes effect. If, for example, a collective bargaining contract provides that
in the event of layoffs, those who were hired last must be laid off first,
such a provision would not be affected in the least by title VII. This would
be true even in the case where owing to discrimination prior to the effective
date of the title, white workers had more seniority than Negroes.
29 See id. Senator Clark submitted a memorandum which answered various
questions concerning the Act which had been raised by Senator Dirksen. Id. at
7216-17. Among the questions and answers are:
Question. Would the same situation prevail in respect to promotions,
when that management function is governed by a labor contract calling for
promotions on the basis of seniority? What of dismissals? Normally, labor
contracts call for "last hired, first fired." If the last hired are Negroes, is the
employer discriminating if his contract requires they be first fired and the
remaining employees are white?
Answer. Seniority rights are in no way affected by this bill. If under a
"last hired, first fired" agreement a Negro happens to be the "last hired,"
he can still be the "first fired" as long as it is done because of his status as
"last hired" and not because of his race.
Question. If an employer is directed to abolish his employment list
because of discrimination what happens to seniority?
Answer. The bill is not retroactive, and it will not require an employer
to change existing seniority lists.
3
0 d. at 7212-15. The relevant portion of this memorandum is as follows:
Title VII would have no effect on established seniority rights. Its effect
is prospective and not retrospective. Thus, for example, if a business has
been discriminating in the past and as a result has an all-white working
force, when the title comes into effect the employer's obligation would be
simply to fill future vacancies on a nondiscriminatory basis. He would not
be obliged- or indeed, permitted-to fire whites in order to hire Negroes,
or to prefer Negroes for future vacancies, or, once Negroes are hired, to
give them special seniority rights at the expense of the white workers hired
earlier. (However, where waiting lists for employment or training are,
prior to the effective date of the title, maintained on a discriminatory basis,
the use of such lists after the title takes effect may be held an unlawful
subterfuge to accomplish discrimination.)
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unaffected by Title VII but adds that an employer could not base
hiring decisions on waiting lists compiled on a discriminatory
basis before the effective date of the Act." However, to base
employment decisions on seniority where minority employees
were prevented from acquiring seniority is analogous to basing
hiring decisions on length of time on a waiting list from which
minority applicants were excluded. That Congress disapproved
of discriminatory waiting lists, but seemed to authorize seniority
systems, may indicate that Congress was insufficiently aware of
the problems posed by the latter.
During the course of the Senate debates, a substitute version
of the entire Act, which was eventually adopted, was introduced.82
Section 703 (h) of the substitute bill provided that it would not
be unlawful for an employer to treat his employees differently
pursuant to a bona fide seniority system." Neither section
703 (h), nor its legislative history, seeks to define "bona fide,"
leaving unclear the relationship between section 703 (h) and the
earlier statements in the legislative history concerning seniority. 4
It is perhaps not unreasonable to conclude, therefore, that Con-
gress chose to leave the resolution of the problems posed by
seniority to the courts rather than codify in the Act the concerns
expressed in the Senate debates. 5
In order to hold that the departmental seniority system in
Quarles violated Title VII, the court had to deal with this legisla-
tive history. Although the legislative history appears to authorize
seniority systems generally, the court noted that Congress did
not appear to have considered the peculiar problem posed by
31 Id.
2 See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 43!,
445-47 (x966).
"' Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be
an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply different stan-
dards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system . . .provided that
such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate because
of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(h) (197o).
4 Senator Dirksen's remarks merely paraphrase the provision. See ixo CoNc.
REC. 12818-i9 (1964). Senator Humphrey noted only that the provision "does
not narrow application of the title, but merely clarifies its present intent and effect."
See id. at 12723. There was no other discussion of the effect of § 703(h) on seniority
systems. The ambiguity of § 703(h) is heightened by the fact that different treat-
ment of employees pursuant to a bona fide seniority system is permitted only where
"such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2oooe-2(h) (1970).
"'See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing under Fair Employment Laws:
A General Approach to Objective Criteria of Hiring and Promotion, 82 HARv. L.
REv. 1598, I614 (1969).
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departmental seniority systems.3 6 More generally, the court
argued that the legislative history was not controlling because
"Congress did not intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the
act." 37 Hence the court concluded that a seniority system which
incorporates differences between employees resulting from past
discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system within the mean-
ing of section 703 (h).38
In other situations where courts have found that strict adher-
ence to the legislative history of Title VII would thwart the goal
of nondiscrimination, the legislative history has been disregarded.
In Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,39 the Supreme Court held that an
employer may not require a high school diploma or a passing
grade on an intelligence test as a condition of employment or
promotion where fewer blacks than whites can meet this require-
ment and where possession of such qualifications is not essential
to successful performance of the job. However, in order to reach
this result the Court had to disregard explicit language in the
legislative history stating that an employer could set his quali-
fications as high as he liked even if this meant that fewer blacks
than whites would receive jobs or promotions." The legislative
"
6 Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 5o5, 516 (1968).
37 Id.
38 Id. at 517.
34oi U.S. 424 (I97).
0 See iio CONG. REC. 7213 (1964) (Clark-Case memorandum) ("An employer
may set his qualifications as high as he likes, he may test to determine which appli-
cants have these qualifications and he may hire, assign, and promote on the basis
of test performance."). Concern in the Senate about testing was prompted by a
hearing examiner's decision under the Illinois Fair Employment Practices Act that
an employer could not base hiring decisions on a general intelligence and aptitude
test because it was obsolete and culture biased. (The decision is reprinted at nio
CONG. REc. 5662-64 (1964)). Reaction in the Senate was uniformly adverse to this
decision. See, e.g., id. at 5999-6000 (remarks of Senator Smathers); id. at 7073
(remarks of Senator Holland).
The Supreme Court read the legislative history to suggest only that Congress
approved job-related tests, see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 434
(1g7i), drawing support for this conclusion from a memorandum submitted by
Senator Case stating that Title VII preserved an employer's "right to insist that
any prospective applicant . . . must meet the applicable job qualifications," iio
CoNo. REc. 7247 (1964). However, the Senate debates do not indicate that
Congress drew any distinction between testing for general aptitude and intelligence
and testing for job ability. Rather, the debates indicate that Congress considered
general aptitude and intelligence tests proper measures of job ability. See, e.g., id.
at 7014 (remarks of Senator Hill); id. at 9599-6o0 (1964) (remarks of Senator
Fulbright). See generally Wilson, A Second Look at Griggs v. Duke Power Com-
pany: Ruminations on Job Testing, Discrimination, and the Role of the Federal
Courts, 58 VA. L. REv. 844, 852-58 (1972).
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history concerning testing is clearly no less adverse to the result
reached in Griggs than the legislative history dealing with senior-
ity is to the application of the perpetuation principle to seniority
systems. The example set by the Supreme Court in Griggs sug-
gests that courts should look to how the congressional goal of
nondiscrimination can best be accomplished without feeling overly
constrained by statements made during the debates on Title VII.
Although the legislative history does not, therefore, control
the interpretation of Title VII, the extent to which elimination
of discrimination requires seniority systems to be reformed de-
pends on the relation of past discrimination to present decision-
making. Title VII was intended to operate only prospectively."'
Congress chose not to undo the existing allocation of employment
even though discrimination may have produced that allocation.
Rather, Congress sought to make a clean break with the past and
ensure that in the future all employment decisions would be
made on a nondiscriminatory basis.42 However, many rules for
making choices among employees look to the employees' past.
Where employment decisions are based on seniority, choices
among employees are determined by the employees' past, that is,
by their length of service in the unit. Consequently where senior-
ity rules are applied without modification, the break between the
past and future which Congress sought to bring about will not be
achieved.43
41 Although Title VII does not explicitly state that it operates only prospectively,
this may be inferred from the fact that Title VII became applicable to employers
of decreasing numbers of employees at successive yearly intervals. See Act §§
70(b), (e), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2oooe(b), (e) (i97o). There are explicit statements in
the legislative history that Title VII is not retroactive. See 110 CONG. REC. 7213
(3964) (Clark-Case memorandum), quoted at note 30 supra; id. at 72X7 (Clark
memorandum), quoted at note 29 supra. The courts have uniformly concluded that
Title VII is not retroactive. See, e.g., Local i89, Papermakers v. United States,
436 F.2d 98o, 987 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (0970).
42 See 130 CONG. REc. 7213 (3964) (Clark-Case memorandum), quoted at note
30 supra.
"a While many rules for making choices among employees look to the em-
ployees' past, and thus may incorporate differences affected by past discrimination,
seniority rules seem particularly subject to attack on this ground. If employment
opportunities are granted to those most able to perform the jobs, the employer
will usually look to the employees' past to predict their ability to perform the
jobs. An employment opportunity might also be granted as a reward for especially
meritorious service in the past. In either case, one looks to the past because the
content of the past is relevant to the standard used in granting the opportunity.
Seniority rules are past-oriented in a different sense. Seniority rules base employ-
ment decisions not on the content of the past but on the mere passage of time in the
relevant unit. Where minority employees have been excluded from the unit they
will be deprived of present and future opportunities. However, this deprivation
is not due to the fact that they were prevented from acquiring necessary qualifica-
tions but only because they were denied jobs in the past.
[Vol. 88 :15441552
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To effectuate the congressional purpose of ensuring nondis-
criminatory employment decisions, differences among employees
which are the result of past discrimination must not be allowed
to determine present decisions. This requires that an attempt be
made to determine what a minority employee's seniority would
have been absent discrimination against him. Thus, in the de-
partmental seniority cases had there been no segregation of de-
partments in the past, blacks would have been assigned to the
formerly white departments at the time they were first hired.44
Had this been done, their departmental seniority in the more
desirable departments would have been approximately equal to
their plant seniority. Allowing blacks to use full plant seniority
once they have transferred into formerly white departments
enables them to compete effectively with white employees in that
department; therefore decisions will no longer incorporate dif-
ferences between employees based on discrimination in the past.45
This approach does not compensate black employees for the years
spent in the less desirable jobs to which they were assigned be-
cause of their race, but allows them to compete for more desirable
jobs in the future.46
41 Even if there had been no segregation of departments, some black employees
would presumably have been assigned to the less desirable jobs. Thus, allowing
all blacks to transfer and carry over seniority may place some of the black employees
in better positions than they would have held even if there had been no discrim-
ination in the past. However, there is no way to determine which black employees
would have been assigned to the less desirable departments. Courts have properly
preferred to tolerate some overinclusiveness in the definition of the class of black
employees to be benefitted by the decrees since this is necessary to afford full re-
lief for the discrimination which has occurred. See, e.g., United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 446 F.2d 652, 66o (2d Cir. 1971).
4' Although the departmental seniority cases deal principally with promotions
and transfers, the analysis has also been applied in situations where revision of the
seniority system results in the layoff of incumbent nonminority employees. In
Guthrie v. Colonial Bakery Co., 6 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 662 (N.D. Ga. I973), the
employer had limited women to the lowest paying jobs in a single department. The
employer then discontinued operations in this department. Under the departmental
seniority system in effect at the plant, the female workers were not allowed to use
plant seniority to bump into other departments. Thus all of the women were
laid off while many male employees with less plant seniority were retained. The
district court held the departmental seniority system unlawful, and ordered that
the laid off female employees be recalled, displacing male employees with less plant
seniority. See also United States v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 6 Empl. Prac. Dec.
ff 8829 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (minority employees who had transferred to more desirable
jobs pursuant to court order holding departmental seniority system unlawful
allowed to use full plant seniority to bump junior employees when jobs to which
they had transferred were abolished).
46 Prohibiting present and future decisions from incorporating differences which
are the result of past discrimination does not redress deprivations suffered in the
The approach to seniority developed in the departmental
seniority cases can also be used in layoff cases where the em-
ployer's past discrimination against minorities often consisted of
their total exclusion from the work force prior to the effective
date of Title VII. In such a situation, layoff decisions based on
the last hired, first fired principle turn on a qualification, length
of service in the plant, which the employer's past discrimination
has prevented some minority workers from acquiring. Had the
employer not discriminated, some of the current minority em-
ployees could have been hired earlier and would, therefore, have
accrued sufficient seniority to avoid layoff. Just as departmental
seniority systems perpetuate the past segregation of the plant,
last hired, first fired layoffs perpetuate the past exclusion of
minority workers from the plant. However, since Title VII re-
quires only that decisions among employees not be determined by
discrimination in the past, a last hired, first fired layoff dis-
criminates only against those present minority employees who
could have been hired earlier absent discrimination.
While the perpetuation principle developed in the departmen-
tal seniority cases therefore seems applicable to layoff cases, there
is language in some of the departmental seniority cases suggesting
that the principle cannot be so applied. In Local r89, Paper-
makers v. United States " the Fifth Circuit concluded that the
legislative history insulating seniority systems applied to plant
seniority but not to departmental seniority.48 The court said that
an employee who was denied a job because of his race could not,
if later hired, claim to have greater seniority than white employees
hired after his original rejection.49 In explaining this assertion,
the court noted that 50
It is one thing for legislation to require the creation of fictional
seniority for newly hired Negroes, and quite another thing for
it to require that time actually worked in Negro jobs be given
equal status with time worked in white jobs.
Thus, the distinction drawn is that it is permissible to grant full
credit to earned seniority but it is impermissible to grant fic-
tional seniority for the time the employee was prevented from
working because of the employer's discrimination.51
past. To redress the past discrimination would require that minority employees be
given back pay for the jobs they would have held absent discrimination.
47 416 F.2d 98o (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 US. 9,9 (1970).
48 Id. at 987-88, 994-95.
49 Id. at 994.
'Old. at 995 (emphasis in original).
"1 The distinction between earned and fictional seniority has been rejected by
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The distinction between earned and fictional seniority seems
to respond to a moral perception that it is improper to grant
seniority credit to one who did not work to acquire it. Such a
distinction might seem justified if the comparison were between
two persons both of whom could have worked, but one of whom
did not. However, where minority applicants were refused jobs
and thus prevented from acquiring seniority in the usual manner,
no fault can attach to their failure to do so. It seems anomalous
to hold that the seniority of minority workers subjected to partial
discrimination, that is, those who were hired but assigned to less
desirable jobs, must be recomputed but that the seniority of mi-
nority workers who were entirely excluded from the work force
cannot be recomputed.52
The Local 189 court's characterization of the relief in the
departmental seniority cases as giving full credit to minority em-
ployees' earned seniority is somewhat misleading. The relief in
the departmental seniority cases is designed to eliminate from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). See EEOC Decision
No. 71-1447, 3 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (1971). The EEOC ruled that an em-
ployer could not base promotions on seniority where some of his black employees
had been prevented from acquiring seniority by the employer's past hiring discrim-
ination. The EEOC rejected the position taken in Local z8g, arguing that it would
be improper to grant relief to those subjected to partial discrimination (by assign-
ment to less desirable jobs) but not to those subjected to complete discrimination
(by exclusion from all jobs). See id. at 393 & n.Io.
2 The earned-fictional distinction was a significant factor in leading the first
court of appeals faced with the issue to conclude that last hired, first fired layoffs
do not violate Title VII. See Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 502 F.2d 1309,
1319-20 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24,
1975) (No. 74-1o64). Furthermore the Fifth Circuit, relying solely on the earned-
fictional distinction, ruled that application date seniority may not be awarded as a
remedy to blacks who applied for jobs and were rejected because of their race. See
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 495 F.2d 398, 417-18 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
43 U.S.L.W. 3510 (U.S. March 24, 1975) (No. 74-728).
Other cases have required modification of seniority systems or enjoined the use
of seniority altogether where minority employees were prevented from acquiring
seniority by past hiring discrimination. In a number of cases brought under the
fourteenth amendment and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (I97O), the use of seniority in
awarding promotions in police and fire departments was held unlawful because past
exclusion of minorities from the forces prevented them from acquiring seniority.
See Afro-American Patrolmen's League v. Duck, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 1124 (6th
Cir. Sept. 26, 1974); Shield Club v. City of Cleveland, 8 Empl. Prac. Dec. ff 9606
(N.D. Ohio July 6, I974); Harper v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 359 F.
Supp. I187 (D. Md.), modified on other grounds and aff'd sub nom. Harper v.
Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134 (4th Cir. 1973); Allen v. City of Mobile, 331 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd per curiam, 446 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412
U.S. 909 (,973). See also Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358 (sth
Cir. I972) (employer's attempt to justify failure to promote blacks on basis of
their lack of experience rejected where blacks could not gain experience because of
prior hiring discrimination).
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present and future decisions the effects of past discrimination.
The mechanism for granting such relief is best seen as an attempt
to recompute black employees' seniority as if they had not been
excluded from the more desirable departments. Plant seniority
can be used for this purpose not because this is the seniority
which black employees have earned, but because plant seniority
is a convenient approximation of what the black employees' de-
partmental seniority would have been absent discrimination in the
past. 3 Thus seen, the effort in departmental seniority cases is
precisely to grant fictional seniority - the seniority which black
employees would have had if they had initially been assigned to
the more desirable departments.
The contrast between earned and fictional seniority, therefore,
cannot be used to distinguish departmental from plant seniority
systems. Thus the Local 189 court's use of that distinction to
infer that the legislative history concerning seniority insulated
plant but not departmental seniority systems from the reach of
Title VII is also invalid. Departmental and plant seniority sys-
tems present the same problem - present and future employ-
ment decisions cannot be made on a nondiscriminatory basis with-
out disturbing the expectations of incumbent white employees.
Since nothing in the Act suggests that Congress intended to dis-
tinguish between these two types of seniority systems, their status
under the Act should be the same.
Last hired, first fired layoffs discriminate against those em-
ployees who would have been hired earlier and thus would have
acquired sufficient seniority to withstand layoff absent the dis-
crimination in the past. The legislative history of Title VII does
not preclude modification of seniority as a remedy for those dis-
criminated against in this way.54 In order to avoid the discrimina-
5 Bing v. Roadway Express, Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (sth Cir. 1973), illustrates that
relief in departmental seniority cases is designed to recompute minority workers'
seniority as if there had not been past discriminaton. The case involved a de-
partmental seniority system in the trucking industry. Blacks had been hired only
as city drivers and were not allowed to transfer to better paying jobs as over-the-
road drivers without losing seniority earned as city drivers. The court noted that
the employer had required one year of driving experience for appointment to road
driver positions. Seniority thus could not be dated as of the time the employee
was first hired as a city driver since he may not have been qualified as a road driver
at that time. The court ordered that transferees be granted seniority dated as of
the time they became eligible by reason of experience to transfer to road driver
positions provided the employer was hiring over-the-road drivers at that time,
This is the seniority they would have had absent discrimination in the past.
" But see Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, LAB. REL. REP. (9 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas.) ii7, 128-29 (3d Cir. Jan. 30, 1975) (legislative history of Title
VII precludes granting relief for last hired, first fired layoffs) ; Waters v. Wisconsin
Steel Works, 502 F.2d 2309, 1318-20 (7th Cir. 1974), petition for cert. filed, 43
U.S.L.W. 3476 (U.S. Feb. 24, 1975) (No. 74-2o64) (same).
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tory effects of layoffs, seniority must be recomputed as if the past
discrimination had not occurred.
B. Constructing a Remedy
Implementation of a remedy under the perpetuation theory of
Title VII requires that a class of employees who are discriminated
against by the layoff be defined. The class should include only
those current minority employees who could have been hired
earlier absent discrimination. Furthermore, a method of recom-
puting seniority of class members must be devised.
The simplest case for creating such a remedy is that of a
minority employee who was previously rejected for a job because
of his race. Where the date of his previous application is known,
his seniority could be recomputed as of that time. Without re-
computation, a last hired, first fired layoff clearly discriminates
against such a person for, absent discrimination, he would have
begun to accrue seniority at the time of his application.
The person who applied and was discriminatorily rejected
may, however, be the unusual case, since the fact that an employer
refused to hire minority workers may have dissuaded these work-
ers from making futile applications. Persons who were dissuaded
from applying by the employer's reputation are discriminated
against just as much by the layoff as those who actually applied
and were rejected. That the fact of application is irrelevant in
determining the membership of the class to be remedied has been
recognized in numerous cases.5 5 In the first cases challenging
union referral rules, for example, evidence was introduced show-
ing that there were specific qualified tradesmen in the area who
sought to use the hiring hall and were refused referral because
of their race.56 In such cases, the remedy ordered was that these
"In Bing v. Roadway Express Inc., 485 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1973), a depart-
mental seniority case, the defendant argued that minority employees should be
granted seniority only from the time that they applied for transfer and were re-
jected because of their race. The court stated that the defendant's argument "fails
to account for the realities of entrenched employment discrimination. If an employee
realizes full well that blacks simply are not hired [for positions in the more de-
sirable department], why should he bother to apply?" Id. at 451; accord,
Rodriguez v. East Texas Motor Freight, 5oS F.2d 40, 63-64 (5th Cir. 1974); cf.
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245, 247 (ioth Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 954 (197i) (fact that minority workers have not applied for jobs
does not rebut inference of discrimination since it is probable that minority workers
knew they would not be hired); Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian
Hospital Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967) (same) ; Lea v. Cone Mills Corp.,
3oi F. Supp. 97, 102 (M.D.N.C. i969), aff'd in pertinent part, 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir.
197X) (same). Contra Thornton v. East Texas Motor Freight, 497 F.2d 416, 421
(6th Cir. 1974).
" See, e.g., Dobbins v. IBEW Local 212, 292 F. Supp. 413, 424-29 (S.D. Ohio
I968).
1975] 1557
specific persons be offered immediate referral.57 In United States
v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36 58 the court went further and
granted relief even though there had been no showing that par-
ticular persons had applied for and been refused referral. The
court observed that, where there were qualified black tradesmen
in the area who were aware that the union would not allow blacks
to use the hiring hall, it would be unrealistic to expect blacks to
apply for referral.5" The union was ordered to place all qualified
black tradesmen with the necessary amount of experience in the
first priority group regardless of whether they had previously
applied for referral." Thus, there is precedent for including in
the class of current minority employees who are discriminated
against by last hired, first fired layoffs not only those who previ-
ously applied, but also those who never applied but could have
been hired earlier if the employer had not discriminated.
The first criterion to be used in defining this class is the age
of the current minority employees. The largest possible class in-
cludes only those who are old enough to have been in the job
market at the time of the employer's past discrimination. Those
young minority workers who are recent entrants into the labor
market should not be included since they could not have been
hired during the period of discriminatory hiring. A second cri-
terion is the residence of the current minority employees. Only
those who were living in the area at the time of discriminatory
hiring should be included since only they could have been hired
earlier.6 The use of these two criteria should not pose difficult
problems of proof and will define the group of current minority
workers who, but for the discrimination in the past, would have
been hired by the employer.02
Age and residence would not seem to limit adequately the
class to those who could have been hired earlier if some of the
employees did not possess adequate skills for the job at the earlier
time or if some of them had equivalent or better jobs at that time.
In either of these circumstances, the layoff would not discrimi-
nate against them since they would not have been hired earlier
" See, e.g., id. at 450-51.
5846 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
5Id. at 131-32.
6 I1d. at 133.
61 The relevant area should be defined as the area from which the employer's
work force was drawn at the time of the past discrimination.
62 It is true that the present minority employees may not be the specific persons
who would have been hired earlier absent discrimination. However, since the
present minority employees were eventually hired, it is not unreasonable to assume
that they would have been hired earlier but for their race. Toleration of this degree
of imprecision is necessary if adequate relief is to be granted. The same approach
has been adopted in departmental seniority cases. See note 45 sUpra.
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even if the employer had not been hiring on a discriminatory
basis. Except in special circumstances, the group of current em-
ployees is unlikely to include such persons. Since in many indus-
trial plants, employees are initially hired for unskilled entry level
positions and receive on the job training,6" the level of qualifica-
tions necessary for initial hiring will often be very low. Only where
the jobs require special skills not possessed by most workers is it
necessary to require some indication that the current employees
also possessed these skills at the earlier time. Persons who held
equivalent or better jobs at the time of the discriminatory hiring
are also generally unlikely to be included in the class. Since an
employee would be unlikely to leave one job for another unless
he were moving to a better job,64 such persons will be in the group
only where a plant offering better jobs has closed down or laid
off workers. Where this may have happened, an examination of
the workers' employment history would be necessary to define
more precisely the group to be remedied. Since neither of these
circumstances are sufficiently likely to warrant modification of
the class, it will generally be proper to define the class by age and
residence alone.65
Having defined the class of present minority employees to be
benefitted by the decree, a mechanism for recomputing the senior-
ity of class members must be devised. Since the class will include
persons who did not apply for jobs during the period of discrimi-
natory hiring, seniority cannot be computed from the date of
application. An attempt might be made *to determine when class
members might have applied absent discrimination, but this is
likely to be very difficult. Considerations of administrative con-
venience suggest that it would be preferable to recompute the
seniority of the members of the class on the basis of age. Seniority
credit could be awarded such that class members would have
seniority equal to the average seniority of nonminority workers
of the same age.6 6 This approach will closely approximate the
63See P. DOERINGER & M. PIORE, INTERNAL LABOR MARKETS AND MANPOWER
ANALysIs 17-22 (Ig7I).
6 Since an employee who changes employers must forfeit seniority rights built
up at his previous plant and begin anew at the bottom of the seniority roster in
the new plant the burden of changing jobs is very great.
8 Because it is generally unlikely that the use of ability or employment history
data would significantly alter the class, the burden should be on the defendant to
put in issue the relevance of this data for definition of the class. Once the employer
has shown that he required a significant level of skill for entry level positions, the
burden should shift back to the plaintiff to show that he met that requirement at
a prior date. However, since it is inherently unlikely that the plaintiff switched
from a better job to his present job, the burden should be on the defendant to
establish this.
" Cf. Cooper & Sobol, supra note 35, at 1636 (suggesting age-seniority compu-
tation for purpose of promotion).
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seniority which minority employees would have had absent the
discrimination in' the past since it is reasonable to assume that
absent such discrimination class members would have been hired
at the same time as nonminority workers of the same age. 7 Once
seniority has been recomputed for class members the layoff will
not be discriminatory if based on the last hired, first fired
principle."
II. THE APPLICATION OF Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
TO LAYOFF CASES
In Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369,69 the court found
that the last hired, first fired layoff was discriminatory because it
perpetuated the effects of past discrimination. While this analysis
established discrimination only against some blacks,70 the court
granted a remedy which benefitted black employees regardless of
whether they were discriminated against by the layoff.71 However,
67 If this approach is adopted, it should also be applied to class members who
did apply for jobs during the period of discriminatory hiring for reasons of ad-
ministrative convenience and to avoid inequitable treatment of different members of
the class. Furthermore, where it was well known that the employer was discrim-
inating, the date of actual application may be an inaccurate measure of when ap-
plication would have been made absent discrimination.
"s Where the layoff is extensive some of the class members may be laid off even
if their seniority is recomputed. In some situations it may be possible to grant
a remedy to class members without displacing incumbent nonminority workers. In
Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 729 (E.D. La. May
14, 1974), supplementing 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal docketed,
No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974, the court ordered that a percentage of the
laid off black employees be reinstated and that no additional white employees be
laid off. Available work was to be shared and all employees were to receive a full
week's pay. See id. at 730-31. Similarly, a court could allow the layoff of only
those minority workers who would be laid off if recomputed seniority were
used and only those nonminority workers who would be laid off if normal seniority
were used. This procedure has the advantage of placing the burden of rectifying the
discrimination on the employer rather than on other employees. This procedure
will be practicable only where the employer is financially able to bear the cost of
retaining a larger work force. In a case such as Watkins where the plant involved
is just one plant of a larger corporation, it is likely that this procedure can be
followed without jeopardizing the solvency of the company. The layoff in Watkins
began in 1971 and continued through 1973. See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local
2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1224 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th
Cir., June 17, 1974. The employer, -Continental Can Company, reported earnings
of $72,93X,000 in 1971, $80,807,000 in 1972, and $95,16g,ooo in 1973. A dividend of
$i.6o per share was paid in each of these years. See 1973 Continental Can Co.,
Inc. Annual Report.
69369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. z974), appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, Sth Cir.,
June 17, i974. See pp. 1545-46 supra.
'o See pp. 1552-54 supra.
1 See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 729 (E.D.
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an alternative theory seeking to justify a broad remedy in layoff
cases has been advanced by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC).72 The EEOC has argued on the basis of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.73 that any employment practice which
has a disparate impact on minority workers violates Title VII
unless the practice "is sufficiently job-related to be justified by
business necessity." 74 While the Supreme Court in Griggs used
this form of analysis to invalidate the use of a high school diploma
and general intelligence test requirement for hiring and promo-
tion,7 5 the application of this analysis to seniority layoffs is
problematic.
Under Griggs if it is found that an employment practice has
a disparate impact on minority workers, a close examination of
the criteria upon which the practice is based is required. 6 Where
such an examination reveals that the criteria used do not accu-
rately reflect permissible grounds for making the employment
decision, that decision is discriminatory.7  Thus in Griggs, use of
tests and high school diplomas as hiring criteria was held unlawful
only because such criteria did not accurately measure job ability,
the only permissible grounds for hiring decisions identified by
the Court. The Court derived its conclusion that job ability was
the only permissible criterion for hiring decisions from its reading
of Title VII,7" however it did not consider which criteria are per-
La. May 14, 1974), supplementing 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir. June X7, 1974.
72 See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae, Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369,
appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974; Brief for EEOC as Amicus
Curiae, Bales v. General Motors Corp., LAB. Rar.. REP. (9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 234
(N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1975).
73 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
7 Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 8, Bales v. General Motors Corp.,
LAB. REL. REP. (9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 234 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 1975); accord,
Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 7-I, Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369,
appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974.
7 See 401 U.S. at 427-31.
7 See id. at 429-32.
17 See id. Application of the Griggs analysis has required a difficult and compli-
cated examination of whether the challenged testing procedures accurately measure
applicants' ability to perform the jobs. See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Power
Co., 474 F.2d 9o6, 912-I9 (5th Cir. 1973). The necessity for such inquiry clearly
indicates that if a test accurately measured job ability its use would not violate
Title VII regardless of whether a disproportionate number of minority applicants
were thereby excluded.
7 While it is probably accurate to read Title VII as requiring that hiring de-
cisions be made on the basis of job qualifications, the Court's conclusion that job
qualification is limited to minimal ability to perform the job and does not include
general intelligence is not supported by the legislative history of Title VII. See
note 40 supra. Even if the Court had accepted a broader view of job qualifications
the analysis would still be applicable where testing procedures do not accurately
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missible for other employment decisions. 9 Nothing in Title VII
suggests that layoffs must be governed by job ability; in fact, Con-
gress appears to have authorized the use of seniority to allocate
layoffs.80 Therefore, layoffs need not be justified under a job-
relatedness test, since such a standard is relevant only where job
ability is the sole permissible criterion.
Section 703 (h) of Title VII,81 which authorizes the use of
bona fide seniority systems, is also an impediment to the EEOC's
interpretation of Griggs as invalidating last hired, first fired lay-
offs. To meet this objection, the EEOC has argued 82 that a
seniority system which perpetuates the effects of past discrimina-
tion is not bona fide. Thus where minority workers were pre-
vented from acquiring seniority by their prior exclusion from the
work force, the EEOC has concluded that seniority may not be
used to allocate layoffs and that some procedure must be devised
which does not have a disparate impact on minority workers."
Since only some minority workers were prevented from ac-
quiring seniority, the seniority system could be rendered bona
fide by recomputing the seniority of these employees. 4 If, as the
EEOC has argued, disparate impact is the discrimination to be
remedied, rather than actual discrimination against identifiable
employees, then the resultng invalidation of seniority, while not
required by the Act, is not inconsistent with the EEOC's approach.
Hence, the EEOC's approach might lead to broad relief in a case
such as Watkins. However, the EEOC's assumption that any
employment decision that has a disparate impact on minority
measure job qualifications, however defined, and exclude a disproportionate number
of minority applicants.
" While there is language in Griggs suggesting broad application of the job
ability standard, see 401 U.S. at 431 ("If an employment practice which operates to
exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."), the Court was considering only test and high school diploma
requirements for hiring and promotion. The problems presented by the use of other
criteria for different types of employment decisions were not before the Court.
Cf. 85 HARv. L. REV. 1482, 1485-87 (1972) which suggests that in applying
the Griggs case to a company rule that employees would be discharged if garnish-
ments were often made on their wages, the job ability criterion is inappropriate.
It is argued that an employer's concern is not simply the employee's job skill but the
employee's total job productivity which might be significantly reduced by excessive
garnishments. Id. at 1486.
"°See pp. 1548-50 & notes 27-33 supra.
81 42 U.S.C. § 2000-2(h) (I97O), quoted at note 33 supra.
2 See Brief for EEOC as Amicus Curiae at 1I-i5, Watkins v. Steel Workers
Local 2369, appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974; Brief for EEOC
as Amicus Curiae at 10-14, Bales v. General Motors Corp., LAB. REI. REP. (9
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 234 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 27, i975).
" See Briefs cited note 82 supra.
84 See pp. I557-6o supra.
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workers violates Title VII unless the decision is based on job
ability, is an unwarranted extension of the Griggs holding.
III. LAYOFFS AND THE USE OF REMEDIES
TO MAINTAIN RACIAL BALANCE
In Watkins, the court concluded that the last hired, first fired
layoff violated Title VII and ordered that a percentage of the
black employees laid off be recalled.85 The percentage was not
based on the number of the present black employees who might
have been hired earlier. Furthermore, no attempt was made to
ensure that the recalled blacks were those who were discriminated
against by the layoff."' Such relief is designed not to ensure that
the seniority system operates in a nondiscriminatory manner, but
rather to ensure that there will continue to be black workers at
the plant.8 7
"' See Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 729 (E.D.
La. May 14, 1974), supplementing 369 F. Supp. 1221 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal
docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974. The percentage of the black em-
ployees to be reinstated was to equal the percentage of the original work force
which remained after the layoff. Id. at 730. Since the court ordered that no
incumbent employees be laid off at the time of the reinstatements, see id. at 731,
the racial composition of the work force would be slightly changed by the layoff.
Work was to be shared among the entire work force and all employees were to
receive a full week's pay regardless of the number of hours actually worked. Id.
The court limited relief to nonprobationary employees, see id. at 730-31, with the
result that only seven black employees were ordered to be reinstated, see Brief for
Appellees at 38, Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, No. 74-2604, 5 th Cir., June
17, 1974.
Other courts which have ordered remedies for last hired, first fired layoffs have
also limited the number of minority employees who may be laid off to a certain
percentage of the work force. In Jersey Central Power & Light Co. v. IBEW, 8
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 69o (D.N.J. Sept. 5, 1974), supplemented, 8 Fair Empl..
Prac. Cas. 959 (D.N.J. Sept. 23, 1974), vacated and remanded, LAB. REL. REP.
(9 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.) 117 (3rd Cir. Jan. 30, 1975), the district court ordered
that layoffs be allocated on the basis of the proportion of minority and non-
minority employees in the work force before the layoff. In Loy v. City of Cleve-
land, 8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 614 (N.D. Ohio March 29, 1974), dismissed as -oot,
8 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 617 (N.D. Ohio June 4, 1974), the court ordered that the
percentage of women in the group laid off be limited to the percentage of women
in the group hired during the previous year.
"The remedy ordered in Watkins cannot be justified as a matter of adminis-
trative convenience. Considerations of administrative convenience may justify toler-
ation of a certain degree of imprecision in the definition of the class to be remedied,
but the Watkins order abandons entirely any attempt to limit relief to those in-
dividuals who were discriminated against by the layoff.
"7 The Watkins court impliedly recognized this.
[in this case, the relief ordered by the Court will not be designed to com-
pensate the blacks who were not hired by the company between 1945 and
i95. It will be designed to insure that, because the Company hired no
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The Watkins court found support for its remedy in cases
ordering preferential hiring quotas.88 In Rios v. Steamfitters Local
638,"9 a construction union was found to have discriminated
against nonwhites by refusing them membership in the union,
discriminating in referral, and participating in a discriminatory
apprenticeship program.90 These discriminatory practices contin-
ued through the time of the suit.9 The Second Circuit affirmed
the district court's order that the union be required to admit
enough minority workers into the union and its apprenticeship
program so that by 1977 minority representation in the union
would approximate the percentage of minorities in the labor
force.92 The court justified such relief on the grounds that once
a violation of Title VII is established courts have broad equitable
power not only to ensure nondiscrimination in the future but
also to eradicate the effects of discrimination in the past.93
Preferential hiring quotas are not remedies for discriminatory
practices in the usual sense in which a court remedies a wrong by
blacks for twenty years, the plant will not operate without black employees
for the next decade.
Vatkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp. 1221, 1231 (E.D. La. 1974),
appeal docketed, No. 74-2604, 5th Cir., June 17, 1974.
8 See p. 1546 & note 12 supra.
S9 Sox F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974). This opinion was handed down after Watkins
was decided. Rios is discussed herein as an example of the line of cases on which
Watkins relied because the Second Circuit's opinion is one of the clearest statements
of the argument in such cases.
'0 See Sox F.2d at 625.
9 1 See id.
92 See id. at 625-27, 632-33. The Second Circuit remanded the case for re-
determination of the percentage of minority members the union was to achieve.
Id. at 633.
"Id. at 629; accord, Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-
28 (ist Cir. I974) ; United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 636 (6th Cir.
3973) ; United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 4o8, 413 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (1973) ; Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 314, 328-31 (8th Cir.) (en banc),
cert. denied, 4o6 U.S. 95o (1972) ; United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d
544, 552-54 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
It should be noted that the courts' use of the phrase "effects of past discrimi-
nation" is unrelated to the principle developed in departmental seniority cases
that present neutral practices which perpetuate the effects of past discrimination
violate the Act. The perpetuation principle is designed to ensure that present and
future decisions among employees will not be determined by differences among them
which are the result of past discrimination. The application of this principle will
only ensure nondiscrimination in the future; no attempt is made to alter the racial
composition of the work force caused by past discrimination. The "effects of past
discrimination" referred to in preferential hiring cases can only be the racial
imbalance of the work force or union. The courts are seeking not merely to ensure
nondiscriminatory selection of employees in the future but also to speed up the
integration of the work force or union by requiring minority workers to be hired
in numbers greater than would result from future nondiscriminatory selection.
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making whole the persons who were harmed. The individual vic-
tims of the discriminatory practices will rarely and only by
chance be the beneficiaries of hiring quotas. Moreover, the bur-
den of such relief falls not on those who are responsible for the
discrimination but on nonminority applicants. Preferential hiring
quotas are remedial only in the sense that they seek to correct
the racial imbalance caused by past discrimination. Thus, where
preferential hiring quotas are ordered, the courts are making
implicit judgments that integration of work forces should proceed
more rapidly than is possible through nondiscriminatory hiring."
The willingness of the courts to issue decrees in hiring cases
designed to ensure the rapid integration of work forces may sug-
gest that layoff cases should be treated similarly.Y5 Where em-
ployers have only recently begun to hire substantial numbers of
minority workers, last hired, first fired layoffs will largely undo
the progress made toward integration of the work forces. While
the policy of ensuring rapid integration of work forces may be
applicable to layoff as well as hiring cases, the question remains
whether the occurrence of a last hired, first fired layoff which
exacerbates racial imbalance is, by itself, a sufficient reason for
imposing broad relief."
The legal foundations of granting broad relief have not been
elaborated with any precision. At the outset, the granting of
preferential quotas to minority members must contend with sec-
tion 703 (j) of Title VII which appears to prohibit quotas 7 Courts
" See Karst & Horowitz, Aflirmative Action and Equal Protection, 6o VA. L.
REV. 955, 963-65 (1974).
" A decree designed to maintain an integrated work force by limiting layoffs
of minority employees will have a significant adverse impact on incumbent non-
minority employees. Nonminority employees who would otherwise have retained
their jobs 'wil have to be laid off. However, the impact of such a decree differs only
in degree from the impact of a hiring quota which diminishes the job opportunities
of nonminority applicants.
0
'Where an employer has continued the discriminatory practices which pro-
duced the racial imbalance in his work force, the courts may have reason to limit
the number of minority employees who may be laid off. If the scope and nature
of the violations established are such that the court would feel justified in ordering
preferential hiring, the court could also limit the percentage of minority workers to
be laid off. In such a situation, the layoff rules would be altered not because the
last hired, first fired layoff is discriminatory. Rather the court, having determined to
ensure the racial balance of the work force, would be using limitations on layoffs as
a means of effecting racial balance much as preferential hiring quotas are used for
that purpose.
9742 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(j) (,970). This section provides that:
Nothing contained in this subchapter shall be interpreted to require an
employer . . . to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any
group because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such
individual or group on account of an imbalance which may exist with re-
spect to the total number or percentage of persons of any race, color,
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have characterized section 703 (j), however, as a prohibition
against finding a'violation of Title VII where there is racial im-
balance without identifiable discrimination. But, where imbal-
ance results from discriminatory practices, courts have not read
section 703(j) as an impediment to ordering preferential hiring
quotas 8  The distinction between imbalance itself and imbalance
caused by discrimination is not clear; 9 nor have courts articu-
lated limitations on the types of violation needed to invoke broad
equitable relief. Nonetheless, the analysis courts have employed
seems to require some nexus between the type of violation and
the grant of broad relief.' As the Supreme Court has noted, in
religion, sex, or national origin employed by any employer . . . in com-
parison with the total number or percentage of persons of such race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin in any community, State, section, or other
area, or in the available workforce ....
Additionally, preferential hiring quotas require differential treatment based
solely on a racial classification and thus raise difficult and largely unresolved con-
stitutional questions. A number of courts have summarily rejected this argument.
See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 2017, 1027 (1st Cir. 1974) ;
United States v. Local 212, IBEW, 472 F.2d 634, 635-36 (6th Cir. 1973). In
Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315, 328-31 (8th Cir. 1971) (en bane), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 950 (1972), the court confronted the constitutional question and con-
cluded that while a decree requiring absolute preference in hiring for a certain
number of minority applicants would be unconstitutional, a decree requiring that
one minority applicant be hired for every two nonminority applicants would be
proper. The Supreme Court recently declined to rule on the constitutionality
of reverse discrimination in Defunis v. Odegaard, 426 U.S. 312 (1974). Commen-
tators have often argued that although preferential hiring quotas raise difficult
equal protection problems they should be upheld as necessary to achieve the com-
pelling state interest in eliminating discriminatory employment patterns. See, e.g.,
Leiken, Preferential Treatment in the Skilled Building Trades: An Analysis of the
Philadelphia Plan, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 84, 98-102 (2970); Note, Employment Dis-
crimination: Statistics and Preferences Under Title VII, 59 VA. L. REV. 463, 484-92
(I973)-
9 See United States v. Lathers Local 46, 472 F.2d 408, 4X3 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 939 (I973) ("[W]hile quotas merely to attain racial balance are for-
bidden, quotas to correct past discriminatory practices are not.") ; accord, Boston
Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1027-28 (ist Cir. 1974); Rios v.
Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622, 63o-3i (2d Cir. 1974). As a matter of
statutory interpretation this is hardly persuasive; however, support for this in-
terpretation can be found in the legislative history of the 1972 amendments to
Title VII. An amendment to strengthen the antipreference provision was defeated,
see Xi8 C ONG. REc. 706 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 1972). One of the principal objections
to the amendment was that it might prohibit court-ordered preferential hiring de-
crees to remedy past discrimination, see id. at 693-94 (remarks of Senator Javits) ;
id. at 705 (remarks of Senator Williams). See generally Comment, The Phila-
delphia Plan: A Study in the Dynamics of Executive Power, 39 U. Cni. L. RE..
723, 753-57 (2972).
9 This distinction seems to collapse in employment discrimination cases fol-
lowing Griggs, where the mere unrebutted showing of disparate impact is sufficient
to find discrimination.
"'o For example, courts have refused to order preferential quotas where, by the
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"cany equity case, the nature of the violation determines the scope
of the remedy." 101
In hiring cases this connection between violation and remedy
can be found. Typically, the racial imbalance was caused by the
hiring practices which the court found to violate Title VII, and
these violations had continued until the time of the suit.' 2 On the
other hand, in layoff cases the nexus is less clear. Where the dis-
criminatory practices which caused the racial imbalance have
ceased, and the only practice before the court affecting the racial
composition of the work force is the layoff, it cannot plausibly be
argued that a decree designed to ensure racial balance is a rem-
edy for discriminatory practices. A broad remedy cannot be re-
garded as a remedy for the layoff since the layoff discriminates
time of the suit, the employer had begun to make efforts to recruit minority work-
ers. See Wade v. Mississippi Cooperative Extension Service, 7 Fair Empl. Prac.
Cas. 282, 298-99 (N.D. Miss. Feb. I5, I974); Commonwealth v. Glickman, 7
Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 598, 6o6-o8 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 15, 1974); cf. Arrington v.
Massachusetts Bay Transp. Authority, 306 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Mass 1969) (quota
refused where, although hiring examination found discriminatory, current list of
eligibles was found racially balanced).
1o Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971);
accord, Milliken v. Bradley, 4x8 U.S. 7,7, 744 (2974); see D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 3-4 (1973); cf. Exodus 21:24 ("Eye for eye, tooth for
tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot"). But cf. Matthew 5:39 (cheek injury treated
differently).
102 See, e.g., Boston Chapter, NAACP v. Beecher, 504 F.2d 1017, 1020-22 (Ist
Cir. 1974); Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 5o F.2d 622, 625 (2d Cir. 2974);
United States v. Lathers Local 46, 471 F.2d 408, 411-12 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
42 U.S. 939 (1973); United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 548
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971).
It may also be significant that most of the cases in wbich preferential hiring
quotas have been ordered involved public employers, chiefly police and fire de-
partments, or building trade unions. See Slate, Preferential Relief in Employment
Discrimination Cases, 5 LOYOLA U. CHi. L.J., 3i8-2o nn.8-xo (1974). There may
be a significant social interest in ensuring minority representation on police forces,
since policemen occupy highly visible positions and are placed in positions of
authority particularly suspectible to charges of racial bias. See Bridgeport Guard-
ians, Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civil Service Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 2341
(2d Cir. i973). Moreover there is some interest in integrating the staff of public
agencies generally so that they may better respond to the problems of minorities.
Sei Slate, supra, at 329-30. See generally Porcelli v. Titus, 431 F.2d 1254 (3d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 944 (i97i) (school department). The building trades
also offer highly visible and highly paid positions in metropolitan areas. See Gould,
The Seattle Building Trades Order: The First Comprehensive Relief Against Em-
ployment Discrimination in the Construction Industry, 26 STAN'. L. REV. 773, 774-75
(i974). Hence it may be desirable to devote particular attention to integrating
these trade unions. Since the building trades unions have rather poor records of
providing opportunities to minority workers, see id. at 733-77; i96 ComimssIox
ON CiviL RIGHTS REPORT, BR. 3, EMPLOYMENT 128-31, the courts may believe that
remedies less drastic then preferential quotas will be ineffective.
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against only some of the present minority workers.' While the
layoff may exacerbate the racial imbalance at the plant, it has this
effect only because of past hiring discrimination. Had the em-
ployer not discriminated in the past, minority employees would
not be concentrated at a low level of seniority and, therefore, the
layoff would not affect the racial composition of the work force.
To regard a limitation on the layoff of minority workers as a
remedy for discontinued past hiring discrimination makes the
layoff irrelevant, and transforms the case into a postponed hiring
discrimination suit. 04 Otherwise, a limitation on minority layoffs
would have to be regarded as a remedy for the imbalance itself
- a result which courts have indicated is barred by section
703 (j).
Considerations of prudence and administration also suggest
that remedies designed to effect racial balance are less appropriate
in layoff, than in hiring cases. The primary reason for preferential
hiring quotas is that a decree limited to enjoining future discrimi-
nation will correct the racial imbalance only over a long period
of time, as the work force is replaced through normal attrition
and new hiring. Preferential hiring quotas accelerate this process
by requiring minority workers to be hired in numbers greater
than would be produced by mere nondiscrimination. Unlike
preferential hiring cases, layoff cases do not involve situations
where a remedy limited to enjoining discrimination would delay
the integration of the work force for a generation or longer. When
the economic circumstances of the employer improve, the laid off
minority workers will be recalled thus restoring the degree of
integration achieved before the layoff. 05
1
o
3 See pp. 1552-54 supra.
104 Since in cases such as Watkins v. Steel Workers Local 2369, 369 F. Supp.
1221, 1223-24 & n.4 (E.D. La. 1974), appeal docketed, No. 74-26o4, 5th Cir.,
June 17, 1974, the hiring discrimination may have occurred largely before the
effective date of Title VII and since Title VII is not retroactive, see note 41 supra,
the past hiring discrimination may not be within the courts' remedial power. It
is possible that a court could find the power to remedy pre-Title VII hiring discrim-
ination in 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), discussed at note 9 supra. However, the statute
of limitations may prevent the court from granting a remedy for past hiring dis-
crimination. The courts have held that the statute of limitations which applies
to the most analogous state action applies to § 1981 actions. See, e.g., Macklin v.
Spector Freight Systems, Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 994 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (3 years);
Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works, 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 911 (1970) (5 years). In any event, to base a broad remedy in a layoff case
on discontinued discriminatory hiring practices the court would have to ack-
nowledge that the decree is designed simply to correct racial imbalance.
"05 Assuming that all positions eliminated in the layoff are ultimately refilled
through a recall, and assuming that minority workers do not forfeit their recall
rights in numbers disproportionately greater than nonminority workers, then the
layoff and recall will, at least, recreate the racial composition which existed prior
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In hiring cases, relief designed to benefit individual victims
of discrimination may not be practicable either because the vic-
tims of discrimination will not be identifiable or because they will
no longer be seeking employment. However, in layoff cases,
it is possible to devise a remedy which benefits all those who are
discriminated against by the layoff since their identity is known
and their seniority can be recomputed. 10 6 Since it is possible to
give complete relief to the victims of discrimination in layoff
cases there is less reason for extending the decree for the benefit
of other minority workers.
Another difficulty with granting a remedy not limited to those
minority employees discriminated against by the layoff is the
legislative history of Title VII. °7 While the legislative history
concerning seniority should not be read to preclude modification
of a seniority system to prevent present and future discrimina-
tion,10 s upsetting a seniority system to redress racial imbalance
caused by prior discrimination is less consonant with the legisla-
tive history. The concern expressed in Congress that Title VII
would disrupt seniority systems was closely tied to a concern that
the Act would be interpreted to require racial balance. 0 9 In
denying that Title VII would affect seniority, the supporters of
the Act seem to have had most clearly in mind that employers
would not be required to achieve racial balance by firing whites
in order to hire blacks." ° The legislative history may not be
determinative, but it does cast considerable doubt on the propriety
of altering seniority solely to correct racial imbalance caused by
past discrimination.
Courts have at times granted relief in employment discrimina-
tion suits which benefits persons other than the victims of dis-
crimination in order to promote the integration of work forces.
However, this has been done only where the present violations
were sufficiently related to the racial imbalance that the broad
relief could be justified as a remedy for the discriminatory prac-
tices established. Only by characterizing such decrees as reme-
dies for discriminatory practices have courts avoided confronting
to the layoff. If some nonminority employees who were hired during the period
of discriminatory hiring forfeit their recall rights, then nondiscriminatory hiring to
fill these positions will actually increase minority representation in the work force.
However, if all positions are not ultimately recreated, then the layoff may skew the
composition of the work force for a significant period.
10 See pp. i557-6o supra.
107 See pp. 1548-49 & notes 27-30 supra.
o See pp. 1549-52 supra.
109 See p. 1548 & note 27 supra.
'




the serious statutory objections to racial quotas. Since the only
violation which can be established in the last hired, first fired
layoff cases is not causally related to racial imbalance, it is un-
likely that courts can find justification for remedies not limited
to those persons discriminated against by the layoff.
IV. CONCLUSION
Although the courts should not use Title VII to remedy racial
imbalance in layoff cases, they should ensure that seniority
systems do not allocate layoffs in a discriminatory fashion. Where
an employer has in the past excluded minority employees from
his work force, a plant seniority system may now operate in a
discriminatory fashion. Those minority employees who might
have been hired earlier have been prevented from acquiring
seniority by past discrimination. If layoffs are based on the last
hired, first fired principle, present decisions between employees
will depend on differences which are the result of past discrimina-
tion. In these circumstances courts should require modification
of the seniority system. Those minority employees who are likely
to have been in the labor force at the time of the past hiring dis-
crimination should have their seniority recomputed to what it
would have been had they been hired earlier. Such modification
will allow the seniority system to operate in a nondiscriminatory
manner. While it is likely that even under a modified seniority
system a disproportionate number of minority employees will be
laid off, Title VII does not provide a basis for remedying this
impact.
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